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Abstract
The determinants of ISO14001 adoption have been considered to fall into two categories:
the external pressure from environment-oriented stakeholders or customers; the internal
need due to expected future benets. In this paper we take a step further to elaborate
on the mechanism of rms' adoption by investigating the interrelationship among rms'
productivity, capital intensity and the decision-making of the adoption. Applying a general
equilibrium model, we show that under optimal condition, highly productive rms can benet
more from the adoption. In the meantime technology advancement potentially drives up the
capital intensity of the rms, and this factor will positively aect rms' incentive of adoption
as well. The empirical practice using the rm-level data in Vietnam veries our predictions
with robustness. In addition, we nd that the phenomenon outlined above becomes even
more obvious in the manufacturing sectors.
Keywords: productivity, capital intensity, ISO14001, Vietnam, environmental protec-
tion.
JEL Classication Numbers: D22, F21, F64, Q56.
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1 Introduction
Due to a rising awareness of environmental protection, there has been an increasing liter-
ature to study the determinants of ISO14001, a voluntary environmental management pro-
gram. Research on external factors indicates that pressure from environmentally conscious
customers plays a important in rms' adoption of ISO14001 (Nishitani, 2010). Whereas
internal determinants such as rm size, the status of having quality management system and
market scope of the industry that the rm belongs to are shown to be important factors
(Arimura et al., 2008, 2011; Nakamura et al., 2001; Welch et al., 2002).
Nevertheless, all these studies try to locate the determinants of ISO14001 adoption from
a relatively objective perspective. From the point view of the rms themselves, what are the
systematic incentives for them to spend substantial cost on adopting this standard even if it
is voluntary rather than compulsory? What is the starting point for rms to think about the
adoption originally? It is natural to assume that when rms are technologically struggling,
usually they can't aord to spend extra money on self-regulated environmental activities.
In other words, rms with technology advancement will have better chance to engage in
environmental protection activities, In fact, recent studies by Levinson (2009), Shapiro and
Walker (2015) have shown a negative relationship between rms' productivity (technology)
and pollution intensity in US.
Following this logic, we pay a special attention to the relationship between rms' initial
technology level and their participation rate in the voluntary environmental program. Drawn
from the rm-level survey data in Vietnam, Figure-1 indicates the dierence in total factor
productivity (TFP) for dierent groups of rms prior to ISO14001 adoption. As we can see,
the average TFP for ISO14001 adopted rms is higher than that for non ISO14001 adopted
ones. Consistent with the previous studies, it occurs to us that the heterogeneity in TFP
tends to be an important decisive factor for rms to adopt the standard.
Figure-1 is inserted here
On the other hand, factor endowment hypothesis, brought forward by Copeland and
Taylor (2004), presents as another interesting theory to describe the relationship between
factor intensity and pollution behavior in the context of international trade1. However,
research on the direct relationship between a rm's factor intensity (we focus on capital
intensity in this paper) and its decision to engage in environmental protection, is very scare.
1The hypothesis argues that when trade liberalizes, countries that are abundant in factors used in clean
industries will grow cleaner.
1
Some of the existing studies mention the positive correlation between capital intensity and
pollution (Mani and Wheeler 1997), but none has taken a step further to investigate how
capital intensity matters for rms' commitment to environmental protection. Our interest
thus lies in the question that under the same pollution level, will capital-intensive rms have
higher/lower incentive to participate in environmental protection program voluntarily?
To answer the above questions and make clear the interrelationship among rms' pro-
ductivity, capital intensity and their adoption of ISO14001, we employ an analytical general
equilibrium model. Driven by the stylized fact as in Figure-1, we put additional assumption
on rms' heterogeneity, which is modeled by their dierential productivity. Each rm draws
a unique productivity level, which leads rms to dier in their equilibrium price markup and
expected total prots. Meanwhile the equilibrium productivity level will aect the capital
intensity of a rm2, and ultimately aects the rm's decision of adopting ISO14001. We then
take the model to the data. Relying upon the detailed rm-level data taken from annual
enterprise survey in General Statistics Oce in Vietnam, we nd that productive rms and
capital-intensive rms have higher incentive to adopt ISO14001, which is consistent with
the predictions from our theoretical model. Other control variables such as rm size and
foreign capital share also play signicant role in shaping the decision on ISO14001 adoption.
In the subgroup estimation, we nd that the inuence of productivity and capital intensity
becomes stronger for manufacturing rms to adopt ISO14001 than for non manufacturing
ones. Whereas foreign capital share turns out to be insignicant for non manufacturing rms
to make the decision.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the theoretical
model weaves together the factors from industrial organization and environmental economics,
using the framework of international trade literature. To our best knowledge, it is the pioneer
one of its kind. Second, we concentratedly analyze the role of the productivity and capital
intensity in shaping a rm's decision-making of ISO14001 adoption. This is one of the few
studies that attempt to clarify the mechanism behind rms' participation in a voluntary
environmental program. Third, by far there has been no research to study the determinants
of ISO14001 in the context of Vietnam. We aim to ll in this blank by making use of the
rm-level information in Vietnam.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we talk briey about the ISO14001
and why it is important to be concerned about environmental protection in the context of
Vietnam. Literature review comes after. In section 4 we apply a theoretical model to show
how rms' decisions are made. In section 5 we describe the data and estimation strategy,
followed by robustness check and ndings. The nal section concludes.
2Or the capital intensity can be modeled as exogenous, depending on the functional assumption.
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2 Background
2.1 About ISO14001
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was founded in 1946, which
has 162 members3 by far, each representing a country. It is the most prominent developer of
standards in the world. In 1980s, ISO introduced ISO9000 standards for quality manufac-
turing practices. Building on this system, ISO set up ISO14001 environmental standards in
19964. According to the denition by ISO, this standard enables rms to adopt the policy
following the legal requirements and provides them with update environmental information.
In other words, it forces the organizations to raise self-awareness of maintaining a healthy
environment and assure themselves of conformity with their stated policies. The benets of
ISO14001 include, but not limited to: reduced cost of waste management and distribution;
savings in consumption of energy and materials; improved corporate image among regula-
tors, customers and the public (ISO Homepage). Despite all the merits, ISO14001 does not
come for free. Due to complicated application procedure, the standard practice is to entrust
an ISO-accredited third party with all the evaluation and paperworks. According to Jiang
and Bansal (2003), the initial consulting fee usually ranges from 24,000 to 128,000 USD. The
additional spending will include training expenses, application fee, auditing fee, etc. Though
the total cost varies from country to country, it can become quite a burden, especially for
small and medium sized rms. Thus rms need to weigh the benets against the expenditure
discreetly before making the decision to apply.
2.2 Why is the issue important in Vietnam?
The pollution level in Vietnam is highly proportionate to its economic growth that de-
pends on the fast industrialization. From Figure 2, we can see that the total pollution in
Vietnam has risen by nearly 150 percent over ve years. Decomposing the contents, we nd
that most of the increase comes from air and solid waste, most of the discharge comes from
industrial activities. Take air pollution, for instance, nearly half of Nitrogen dioxide (NO2)
emission is due to industrial development. When it comes to Sulfur dioxide (SO2), manu-
facturing industry turns out to be the major source (Vietnam: Air Quality Prole 2010).
These two kinds of pollutants are detrimental to both human health and the environment.
3http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso member.htm Accessed on 2015/10/19.
4In recent years, ISO22000 food safety standards, ISO26000 social responsibility standards, ISO36000
risk management standards, and ISO50001 energy management systems are also introduced.
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Figure-2 is inserted here
The pollution in Vietnam is on the verge of eruption and urgent solutions are sought to
prevent the situation from getting worse. By using ISO14001|a voluntary environmental
program as the benchmark, we would like to investigate what are the most important factors
to aect rms' engagement in this program. Because such international standard, among
many others, is proved to be eective in curbing the pollution behavior of rms (Arimura
et al., 2008, 2011, 2014). And we expect to gain some inspiration from this practice, which
would help to raise the overall rms' awareness of environmental protection in Vietnam.
3 Literature Review
By far there have been quite a few of studies to investigate the determinants of ISO14001,
mainly from two perspectives: external and internal. External factors are usually derived
from the demand side, such as the pressure from the stakeholder, customer and the gov-
ernment, or environmental preference. As known as signaling theory (Potoski and Prakash
2005), rms are joining voluntary environmental management programs to show their capa-
bility of dealing with environmental pollution. Representative empirical studies all indicate
a positive relationship between foreign stakeholders and rms' earlier adoption of ISO14001.
Chiristmann and Taylor (2001) with Chinese rm data, Wu et al. (2007) with Taiwanese
manufacturing rm data, Arimura et al. (2008) and Nishitani (2009) with Japanese rm data
all verify this nding. On the other hand, in terms of environmental preference, Nishitani
(2010) uses a sample of 155 countries over eight years to show that customers in environ-
mentally conscious markets are more likely to promote suppliers to adopt ISO14001.
Internal factors refer to rms' internal competence that can also promote rms' engage-
ment in environmental protection. Arimura et al. (2008, 2011), Nakamura et al. (2001),
Welch et al. (2002) reach a unanimous conclusion that larger rms, having quality manage-
ment system and wider market scope of the industry where the rm locates are all important
determinants that are associated with rms' capability. In the meantime foreign ownership is
found to have a positive connection with energy eciency (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; He,
2006; Wang and Jin, 2002). This is interpreted by the advanced waste-processing technology
adopted by foreign rms and their higher awareness to achieve corporate social responsibil-
ities (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). Recent studies such as Tambunlertchai et al. (2013) and
Arimura et al. (2014) use Thai and Malaysian rm data respectively to show that foreign
direct investment (foreign-owned rm or not) is positively related with rms' adoption of
ISO14001. Similar result is achieved (Prakash and Potoski, 2006) in the macro level ver-
ication. On the other hand, capital-intensive industries are relatively pollution-intensive,
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thus rms in such industries are faced with more scrutiny from the customers and local
government (Mani and Wheeler 1997; Gallagher 1999). Acquiring ISO14001 might help sig-
nal pollution-intensive rms' environmental capability and maintain their company image
especially for capital-intensive rms.
However, to our best knowledge, few studies have attempted to elaborate on the real
source of incentive for rms to rush for this standard in spite of its high cost. Levinson
(2009) uses data in USA to show that most of rms' improvement in environmental pro-
tection activities comes with technology progress. While Copeland and Taylor (2003) verify
that rms with higher technology tend to engage in more environment-friendly activities.
Evidence seems to point to the direction that the dierence of technology (or rm's produc-
tivity) is the key to variation in rms' behaviors. Taking advantage of the voluntary nature
of ISO14001 adoption, we want to make clear what is behind the scene.
First in its kind, this paper is positioned as the one to study the real determinants of
rms' strategic decision to participate in the voluntary environmental program. We will start
with an analytical general equilibrium model which can lead to our estimable predictions.
4 Theoretical Model
4.1 General setting
In this section we outline a simple model of rms that produce dierentiated goods and
are faced with the choice of adopting ISO14001 while realizing the costly nature of this
environmental standard. The basic settings are in analogous to the standard models in the
literature of international trade, such as Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2007), Bernard et al.
(2010,2011) (BRS hereafter), but diers in that rms have the new alternatives: apply or
not apply for ISO14001. In contrast to the single-factor endowment setting in these studies,
we assume there are two kinds of inputs used for production to rationalize our empirical
prediction. Since our purpose is to introduce a simple and practical model that can lead
to the data analysis, we try to simplify several assumptions. For example, we ignore the
product heterogeneity and rms' trade status, since such information is not available in the
actual dataset. Our model can be extended to the open economy case if trade information
is to be included.
4.2 Endowments and Preference
Consumers with identical preferences try to maximize their utility by consumption over
a continuum of dierentiated products i 2 [0,1]:
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U = [
Z 1
0
(Ci)
di]
1
 ; 0 <  < 1 (1)
where  = 1=(1  ) is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across products.
In accordance with the domestic-export decision-making literature that emphasizes rms'
heterogeneity in ability, we assume that rms dier in their productivity. In a monopolistic
competitive market with free entry and exit, a rm draws its productivity ' randomly from a
pareto distribution g(') upon paying the xed cost (sunk) fe to start production regardless
of its ownership (foreign or domestic). For simplicity, we think of ' as rm-specic and
constant across industries. Meanwhile a rm has the right to acquire the environmental
standard ISO14001 by paying a larger cost which is proportionate to its total production
cost, i.e. it is the linear combination of the xed consulting cost fx which includes the
consulting fee and application fee, and the unit cost of the input. We can also regard the
extra expense as the preparation fee used on additional personnel and capital to apply for the
standard. To cover the extra expenditure, ready-to-adopt rms have the incentive to raise
the price of the product. And since ISO14001-adopting rms spend more eorts on improving
the \corporate image" of the products, they are justied to set the new price as px (where
px= px, px is the price of the same product before the rm with same productivity applies
for ISO14001)5. We model the extra cost in such a manner that it can be comparable to the
iceberg transportation cost used in international trade. Thus, if the productivity draw 'x is
large enough so that the rm has enough capacity to cover the extra cost used for ISO14001
acquirement and still make prot, the rm will have more incentive to adopt ISO14001
actively.
To take into account capital intensity, we need to deviate from the existing literature that
focuses on the labor input only. Firms use two kinds of factors for manufacturing: labor and
capital inputs. Following BRS, we assume that their supply is inelastic. The unit price for
each factor input are w and r, whereas w stands for wage rate and r represents rental rate.
Based on the modeling method used in Ma et al. (2014), we assume the total cost of the
rm is:
TCe = [fe +
qe
'e
]w1 srs (2)
For simplicity, we omit the superscript for the rm. We choose w as the numeraire (w=1).
s indicates the capital intensity and we will consider two cases. In the rst case, we do not
5At this moment, we assume  is exogenous. However, it can also be modeled as an endogeneous factor
which depends on rms' characteristics. Since we are focusing on the endogeneity of productivity and capital
intensity, such possibility is not discussed in this paper.
6
impose any assumption on s and regard it as exogeneous. The second case is that we assume
s is increasing in a rm's productivity. Since 'x>'e, s('x)>s('e) and the inequality still
holds in equilibrium. We will discuss the scenario in the rst case and come back to the
second one. The prots for a rm to produce without and with ISO14001 respectively are:
e = peqe   rs(fe + qe
'e
) (3)
x = pxqx   rs(fx + qx
'x
) (4)
Firm prot maximization helps us derive the optimal price setting in the status before
and after acquiring ISO14001: pe =
rs
'e
and px =
rs
'x
. Thus the cuto productivity e
(before acquiring ISO14001) above which the rm keeps producing, is determined by the
zero-prot condition:
e = (
rs
'e
)1 P  1
R

  rsfe = 0 (5)
where R is the total expenditure used for production and P is the aggregated price index of
pe. In the same way, we can derive the cuto productivity 

x above which the rm chooses
to adopt ISO14001 and continues producing:
x =
rs
'x
(


  1)R( r
s
'x
) P  1   rsfx = 0 (6)
4.3 Equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium, we can derive the cuto value 'e and '

x, and the relationship between
the two can be expressed as:
'x = '

e; =   (
fx
fe(


  1)( 

) 
)
1
 1 (7)
Apart from the zero-prot condition, the free entry condition should also be cleared. In
other words,
fe = [1 G('e)] 
e + x

= 0 (8)
where G(') is the cumulative distribution function of g('), and  is the surviving rate. For
the convenience of calculation, we assume that it takes a specic form such that G(') =
1 ('0
'
)k, and k > 1. This is a standard function form of Pareto Distribution. e and x each
stands for the expected average prot of a rm conditional on the status before and after
adopting ISO14001. Because of law of large number, e and x can be represented as the
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function of 'e and '

x respectively
6. Thus we can solve two unknowns with two Equations
(7) and (8), and the dierence is:
x   e = rs[F ('x)  F ('e)] (9)
where F () is the expected average prot excluding the factor of rs in equilibrium. From
the assumed function form of Equations (7) and (8), we can derive F () as an monotonically
increasing function in 'i ; i 2 fe; xg, because    1 > 0. For a rm to apply for ISO14001
given the higher xed cost, it is reasonable to expect that x > e, thus F ('

x) > F ('

e).
Together with the increasing nature of F (), we can conclude that 'x > 'e. In other words, it
is the dierence in the expected equilibrium productivity under dierent status (non-adopted
and adopted) that leads to rms' incentive to acquire the standard7.
On the other hand, when the impact of productivity gap is excluded and ceteris paribus,
the dierence between x and e solely depends on r
s. Since we have dened w as 1 and
capital input is basically more costly than labor input, we can assume that r > 1. As s
increases, the expected prot gain after the adoption of ISO14001 will be enlarged, which
gives the rm more incentive to apply for this standard. Based on the above arguments, we
give the following proposition, which will be veried in the empirical estimation section.
Proposition 1: In a closed economy, holding other characteristics unchanged, higher pro-
ductivity will increase a rm's willingness to adopted ISO14001. In the meantime, the more
a rm is capital intensive, the more likely it is to adopt ISO140018.
4.4 Other control variables
Although not the key focus of this paper, we would like to discuss in brief how to model
the other factors that might aect its decision to adopt ISO14001. We have mentioned
in the earlier section that foreign-owned rms care more about their corporation social
responsibility because the eort towards environmental protection will in fact aect the
company image. Empirical evidence can be found in Prakash and Potoski (2011)9. In the
meantime, foreign-owned rms are faced with more scrutiny from the foreign shareholders
who have higher preference of \green" products (Bui and Kapon 2012). Therefore, the
6See Appendix A-1 for detailed derivation.
7See Appendix A-2 for details
8As for the case when s is endogeneously determined by each value of ', it does not change our qualitative
prediction. See Appendix A-1 for detailed discussion.
9Though their practice is from the macro perspective by exploring FDI stock's impact on the number of
ISO14001 adoption in developing countries.
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more foreign capital a rm has, the more cost it is willing to spend on environment-friendly
activities including ISO14001 adoption. Apart from that, the size of the rm and the waste
management department might also matter.
In previous section we have assumed that  is exogenous. Suppose  in fact consists of
the potential determinants outlines above, and an unobserved term. From Equation (7) and
derivation in Appendix A-3, we know that:
'x = '

e
rs('

e)
rs('x)
   ( fx
fe(


  1)( 

) 
)
1
 1
Using some algebra and '

e
'x
can be approximately expressed as:
'e
'x
= rs('

x) s('e)    (FDI share; firm size; waste management; unobserved)
where  = F (; ; fe; fx) and is constant. Since the probability of adopting ISO14001 is
('

e
'x
)k = (rs('

x) s('e) )k, we take logarithm on both sides and come up with the expression
which leads to our emipirical estimation:
ln
'e
'x
= ln+1lnrs('x) s('e)+2ln(FDI)+3ln(firm size)+4ln(waste management)+
(10)
where the last term is the unobserved rm characteristics that might aect a rm's decision of
ISO14001 adoption. In the next section, we will use matched data from Vietnam to estimate
Equation (10). 1 and 2 are of our research interest. 1 is expected to have positive sign,
and the signs of 2-4 are to be determined via empirical tool.
5 Estimation Strategy and Data
5.1 Data
This paper uses a panel dataset, constructed from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey at rm
level. The data was collected by the General Statistics Oce of Vietnam for all sectors and
industries, as on March 1st annually. It covers all 22 manufacturing sectors out of the total 42.
Since most ISO14001 adopters are concentrated in manufacturing industries (81%), we will
limit our analysis to manufacturing rms only. Company characteristics such as ownership,
labor, capital stock, turnover, assets, FDI share, average wage rate, intermediate materials
are also available. Apart from the above, GSO has taken a census of all multinational
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enterprises (MNEs), which are dened rms that have foreign capital, regardless of the
share. The advantage is that investment behavior of these foreign capitalized rms can be
captured over time. Census is also taken for rms with more than 10 employees. Each rm
has an exclusive enterprise code. We use it together with province code to identify the rms.
Another uniqueness of this dataset is that it collects information on rms' engagement in
environmental protection, including the cost spent on environmental protection, whether the
rm carries out environmental management system, whether it follows the clean manufac-
turing process, etc. And above all, whether the rm has ISO14001 certication is recorded.
Since it is relatively objective criteria that is free of measurement error, we use it to create
our ISO adoption dummy. Unfortunately, the ISO information is only accessible from 2007
to 2009, we have to limit our analysis to this time period. Finally, the detailed data on waste
discharge categorized by form (air, liquid, solid) is also available.
There are also some limitations concerning the data, for instance, the incomplete informa-
tion about export and import, missing data for materials and other variables, inconformity of
units among dierent years, etc. As a result, we have to deal with an unbalanced panel data
here. We remove the missing observations, and delete outliers. After these arrangements,
the total number of observations for estimation is 28274 over three years.
Table 1 is inserted here
In practice, we will replace capital intensity and foreign capital share with their one period
lag respectively to alleviate reverse causality concern. We will change the specications to
see how robust it is.
5.2 Baseline estimation and results
The dependent variable is a binary choice. Thus in the baseline estimation we apply
the random-eect panel Logit or Probit, and model a rm's decision making of ISO14001
adoption as the conditional mean of rms' observed idiosyncratic characteristics. In practice,
to alleviate the reverse causality concern, we replace the variables of interest with their one
period lags.
In the rst two columns of Table 2, we would like to verify the sole inuence of a rm's
productivity on its decision making, as predicted in the rst part of Proposition 1. Since we
don't have enough information on the intermediate goods, Levinsohn and Petrin style TFP
can not be fully applied. As an alternative, we adopt the stochastic frontier method. See the
details in Lovell and Kumbhakar (2000). We only include year dummy, industry dummy and
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waste department dummy as control variable. In either specication, TFP is positive and
strongly signicant. Though the coecient varies between models, the robustness provides
sucient evidence that it is one of the most important determinants for a rm to adopt
ISO14001.
We show the results of estimating Equation (10) in Columns (3) and (4). While produc-
tivity maintains its signicancy, foreign capital share, total employment, waste department
dummy and capital labor ratio, are all statistically signicant at the 1% level. The estimated
coecient of foreign capital share is positive, which means that rms with foreign capital
actively adopt ISO14001. The positive sign of total employment indicates that the larger
a rm is, the more likely it is to adopt ISO14001. One explanation might be that larger
rms have more capacity to participate in such voluntary programs. In accordance with our
theoretical prediction, capital labor ratio is positive, implying that capital-intensive rms
have more incentive to adopt ISO14001.
Table 2 is inserted here
5.3 Robustness check and further issues
Robustness check
Though reverse causality is considered in the baseline estimation, another source of en-
dogeneity might arise: the sample selection. It is natural to assume that rms with higher
productivity (or capital intensity) might select to adopt ISO14001 to gain further prots,
and the selection bias will aect our estimation of the coecients of the variables. To alle-
viate the bias, we adopt the \ivprobit" model. The instrument needs to be correlated with
productivity or capital intensity, but does not aect the decision of ISO14001 adoption. In
practice, we use the number of workers whose education levels are equal to or above col-
lege, as the instrumental variable (IV). This measurement is quite likely to aect a rm's
productivity level, but less possible to determine the ISO14001 acquirement.
We make additional eorts to test the robustness of other control variables as well. Apart
from applying waste department dummy as the determinant of ISO14001 adoption, we use
total cost environmental and environmental system as proxies alternatively. Furthermore,
to disentangle the potential impact that the existing pollution level might have on rms'
willingness to apply, we include the amount of liquid and solid waste discharge as additional
control variables. Such practice does not change the qualitative results concerning the roles
that capital intensity and foreign capital share of a rm play. Due to space constraint, we
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do not present all the estimation results but they are available upon request.
Dierence across industries
Given the fact that most rms adopting ISO14001 are in the manufacturing industry, we
have the reason to believe that the incentive for the rms from other industries to adopt
ISO14001 can be dierent. We are thus motivated to conrm how the impact of the determi-
nants of ISO14001 adoption diers across industries. Accordingly, we further divide samples
by industry and conduct the estimation as in Equation (10). The upper panel of Table 3
shows the results when we use the samples in food industry only and the lower panel is for
the manufacturing industry.
Productivity is positive and signicant for both industries. However, the magnitude of
its inuence in the manufacturing industry is larger than that in the food industry, showing
that the technology is crucial for manufacturing rms to care more about their engagement
in environmental activities. Meanwhile, when we limit the samples to food industry, foreign
capital share lost its signicance. This indicates that foreign rms in those industries other
than manufacturing might not value the corporate social responsibility as much as those in
the manufacturing industry. It is also likely that foreign-owned rms from manufacturing-
excluded industries in Vietnam do not respond actively to the shareholders' expectation of
\green products". On the other hand, capital labor ratio is still signicant, but its marginal
eect is reduced to half of that as in the manufacturing industry. The interpretation is
that since in manufacturing sectors, rms produce products that heavily rely on usage of
labor, machines and tools, the costs and benets of applying more eco-friendly inputs will
be weighed in a more serious way by each rm. Consequently capital intensity plays a
relatively more important role in rms' decision of ISO14001 adoption. The post-estimation
likelihood-ratio test ensures the appropriateness of the model (rejection of the null).
Table 3 is inserted here
6 Conclusion
We use the rm level survey data from 2007-2009 in Vietnam to investigate the determi-
nants of the adoption of ISO14001, a voluntary environmental standard. We try to uncover
the mechanism of how rms form the decision of adoption. Theoretically, by employing a
general equilibrium model, we show that more productive and capital intensive rms will
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systematically have higher incentive to adopt because of the larger expected benets, despite
a higher xed and variable cost. In the empirical verication, a random-eects Probit (Logit)
model is applied to conrm our prediction. Some robustness checks are conducted and the
qualitative results remain unchanged.
Furthermore, we try to verify the dierential inuence that the above determinants might
have on ISO14001 adoption of rms in dierent industries. Both productivity and capital
intensity have higher decisive impact on the ISO14001 adoption of rms from non-food
manufacturing industry that those from other industries. In the meantime, foreign capital
share shows its signicancy particularly in manufacturing industries, which to some extent
oers the evidence to refute the critics of \pollution haven hypothesis" due to foreign rms'
active investment activities.
The above ndings can lead to some policy implications that are especially critical to
Vietnam because the country is faced with serious pollution problem. Due to the notion that
ISO14001-adopting rms have generally higher awareness of environmental protection, it is
urgent that Vietnamese government explore more ecient ways to promote all rms' engage-
ment in voluntary environmental program (not limited to ISO14001). Technology progress
poses as a solution (which reduces rms' abatement cost), but it needs be supplemented by
such policies as subsidies and tax exemption provided to domestic rms that show capability
to engage in environmental protection.
Last but not least, our paper can be improved in many ways. For example, it would
be more practical to take into account the inuence of international trade, because a rm's
eort towards adoption environmental standard is also associated with its export destination
and how much it trades. Further extension can take into account industrial and regional
heterogeneity as well.
7 Appendix
A-1: Derive a rm's average prot as a function of its equilibrium productivity
level '.
The productivity distributions for non ISO14001-adopted and adopted rms are: e(') =
g(')
1 G('e) if '  '

e and x(') =
g(')
1 G('x) if '  '

x. And the average prots of a rm before
and after adopting ISO14001 can be expressed as follows:
e =
Z 1
'e
e(')g(')
1 G('e)
d' (11)
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x =
Z 1
'x
x(')g(')
1 G('x)
d' (12)
where we can rewrite Equation (11) as:
Z 1
'e
[('eP )
 1(rs) R  rsfe]g(')
1 G('e)
d' (13)
Let  be the rm's revenue, i.e. p  q. Following BRS (2010), we have
('00)
('0)
= (
'00
'0
) 1
) e('

x)
e('e)
= (
'x
'e
) 1
(14)
Substituting Equation (14) into (13), we get:
e =
Z 1
'e
[( '
'e
) 1rsfe   rsfe]g(')
1 G('e)
d'
The zero prot condition indicates that rsfe is equal to ('

e), thus e can also be repre-
sented by 'e's function. In the same way, x can be written as a function of '

x as well.
A-2: Numerical example to show a rm's incentive to adopt ISO14001.
We focus on the general prot conditions: Equations (5) and (6). After rearranging, the
rst terms on the right hand side of both equations become the following:
1

 ('e) 1(rs)1 RP  1 (15)
(


  1)   ('x) 1(rs)1 RP  1 (16)
For simplicity, we leave out the common factor and only have to compare 1

 ('e) 1
with ( 

  1) . Following Balistreri et al. (2011), we let  = 3:8, then  = :74. We further
assume that  < 1:1, since In reality, it is hard to imagine that rms are willing to pay
an extra 10% (or larger) of its total operation cost to acquire the voluntary environmental
standard. Though a larger  over 1.1 will not change our prediction.
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Substituting the values into the above expressions and we get 1

 ('e) 1  :356 and
( 

 1)   :338. Because the prot function is increasing in ', to satisfy Equation (5) and
(6), a larger 'x will be necessary so that the value of the term in Equation (16) surpasses that
of the term in Equation (15)10. This lends support to the notion that without the growth of
productivity, a rm will have little chance to start considering the adoption of ISO14001.
A-3: Discussion on the case when capital intensity s is also the function of the
rm's productivity '.
As shown by Yeaple (2005), Harrigan and Reshef (2012), Verhoogen (2008), productive
rms are usually more capital-intensive. Thus it is natural to make the assumption that @s
@'
>
0. Since r > 1, rs is therefore a monotonically increasing function of a rm's idiosyncratic
productivity. Accordingly, Equation (7) becomes:
'x =
rs('

e)
rs('x)
 'e; =   (
fx
fe(


  1)( 

) 
)
1
 1
From Equation (9), we know that x   e = rs[F ('x)   F ('e)] > 0, and since rs('x) >
rs('

e), we will have rs('

x)F ('x) > r
s('e)F ('e) as long as '

x > '

e. Another way to conrm
rms' decision-making is to calculate the probability of ISO14001 adoption. Similar to the
probability of export in Melitz (2003), a rm's willingness to adopt ISO14001 PISO can be
expressed as: 1 G('

x)
1 G('e) , where '

x and '

e are cuto values for ISO14001 adoption and initiating
production. Given the specic function form of G, we have the following expression:
PISO = (
'e
'x
)k = (
rs('

x) s('e)

)k; k > 1
Because  is assumed to be constant, as s increases, PISO will be enlarged as well,
indicating that the capital intensity level determines a rm' propensity to adopt ISO14001.
10When  approaches 1 from above, (    1)  will be enlarged to get close to 1 . In the special case
when  = 1, which indicates that fx = fe, Equations (5) and (6) will converge.
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Pre-TFP for ISO14001-adopted firms  Pre-TFP for non ISO14001-adopted firms 
	  	  	  	  	  Source: Annual Enterprise Survey, GSO Vietnam 
      * TFP is calculated using Stochastic Frontier Method. 
Figure-1　The difference in firms’ TFP in Vietnam 
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Figure-2  ISO14001 adoption rate by capital intensity  
Year 2007-2009 in total 
 
 
Each year 
 
Source:  Annual Enterprise Survey, GSO Vietnam 
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 Figure-3  Pollution Level in Vietnam (tons) 
	  
Source: GSO, Vietnam and World Bank IPPS  	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Table 2  Baseline Estimation Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Logit Probit Logit Probit 
Dependent Variable ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy 
Lag (TFP) 7.450*** 4.094*** 6.102*** 3.338*** 
 (0.892) (0.493) (0.875) (0.485) 
Lag (foreign capital share)   0.00793*** 0.00438*** 
   (0.00201) (0.00112) 
Total number of workers   0.000467*** 0.000262*** 
   (6.96e-05) (3.81e-05) 
Lag (capital labor ratio)   0.000280*** 0.000155*** 
   (9.25e-05) (5.00e-05) 
Manufacturing industry dummy 0.786*** 0.430*** 0.530** 0.286** 
 (0.230) (0.128) (0.241) (0.133) 
Food industry dummy 0.243 0.134 0.299 0.162 
 (0.283) (0.157) (0.287) (0.158) 
Waste department dummy 2.810*** 1.534*** 2.556*** 1.388*** 
 (0.248) (0.117) (0.236) (0.115) 
Observations 8,283 8,283 8,283 8,283 
Number of id 5,961 5,961 5,961 5,961 
Note: Random-effects Logit and Probit models are applied. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies are included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3  Industry Comparison 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Logit Probit Logit Probit 
Dependent Variable ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy ISO14001 Dummy 
Food industry     
Lag (TFP) 5.652*** 3.041*** 4.785*** 2.557*** 
 (1.124) (0.617) (1.125) (0.612) 
Lag (foreign capital share)   0.00200 0.00114 
   (0.00381) (0.00208) 
Total number of workers   0.000319*** 0.000180*** 
   (0.000117) (6.47e-05) 
Lag (capital labor ratio)   0.000199** 0.000109** 
   (9.95e-05) (5.28e-05) 
Waste department dummy 2.267*** 1.212*** 2.102*** 1.118*** 
 (0.299) (0.159) (0.300) (0.159) 
Observations 3,166 3,166 3,166 3,166 
Number of id 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
Manufacturing industry 
Lag (TFP) 8.918*** 4.943*** 7.382*** 4.089*** 
 (1.336) (0.727) (1.295) (0.722) 
Lag (foreign capital share)   0.00915*** 0.00508*** 
   (0.00252) (0.00140) 
Total number of workers   0.000529*** 0.000297*** 
   (9.10e-05) (4.97e-05) 
Lag (capital labor ratio)   0.000381** 0.000215** 
   (0.000157) (8.57e-05) 
Waste department dummy 3.147*** 1.745*** 2.886*** 1.594*** 
 (0.381) (0.163) (0.364) (0.166) 
Observations 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 
Number of id 3,582 3,582 3,582 3,582 
Note: Random-effects Logit and Probit models are applied. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Year dummies are included.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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